As a testament to just how long extradition cases can take, we turn our attention this morning to Rod Lauren Strunk, who is suspected of murdering his wife, actress Nida Blanca, nearly 4 years ago in the Philippines.
[1] Mr. Strunk left the Philippines in February of 2002 to visit his ailing mother; he was arrested and detained in Las Vegas, in November of 2003, after the Philippines government filed an extradition request for him.
[2] That request failed, and the Philippines is preparing to file a new request for Mr. Strunk; Philippines Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez says “I only have the draft. I still have to finalize it.”
[3]The original extradition request sheds some light on the elements a government must prove to obtain the extradition of a person held by the United States. US Magistrate Judge Gregory Hollows presided over the original request, and he stated that “all provisions of the extradition
treaty must be honored including those which set minimum standards for permitting extradition in the first place.”
[4] At issue in the case was whether the Philippines’ request was “accompanied by such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested States [the United States], would provide cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there.”
[5]In an extradition hearing, the judge “applies a standard similar to that of a preliminary hearing, determining whether the evidence justifies holding the accused for trial, not whether the evidence may justify a conviction.”
[6] In order to find Mr. Strunk extraditable, the court would have to find that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the fugitive; that the crime for which surrender is requested is an extraditable offense covered by a valid and enforceable treaty; and that there is competent and sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause that the accused committed the alleged offense.
[7]In this case, the only element at issue was whether the evidence presented by the Philippines was sufficient. The requesting country is not required to submit all its evidence, and the court has limited discretion in determining what evidence to admit in opposition to an extradition request; in other words, the “general ‘rule of non-contradiction’ holds that evidence may not be offered to contradict testimony or challenge the credibility of a requesting country’s evidence.”
[8] However, a fugitive can “’offer evidence that tends to explain the government’s case of probably cause.’”
[9] In other words, while the fugitive cannot make the court weigh conflicting evidence, he is nonetheless “permitted to produce evidence in an attempt to ‘negate’ or ‘obliterate’ probable cause.”
[10] As a final consideration, “[i]nternational extradition proceedings are not governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the hearsay prohibitions, or the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee.”
[11]Calling the evidence in the case “a confusing mish-mash of declarations within declarations, some containing argument, and some only facts,”
[12] the Court determined that “the evidence
submitted by the Philippines concerning Strunk’s participation in the murder of Blanca is so inconsistent and conflicting that it provides little competent evidence to support the conclusion that Strunk hired [a third party] to murder Blanca.”
[13] Furthermore, the evidence “
submitted by Strunk obliterates the case presented by the Philippines.”
[14] Therefore, the court denied the request for a certificate of extradition.
The final point to consider in all this, however, is the Court’s final paragraph. “This decision does not say that the Philippines could never make a case against Strunk should new, competent evidence be submitted,”
[15] and while neither country has a right to appeal a decision not to extradite, “double jeopardy principles are not in play, and a later, good faith attempt at extradition can be made.”
[16]
[1] DoJ Readies Extradition Case vs. Nida Blanca Murder Suspect, INQ7.net, Nov. 7, 2005, available here.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] In re Extradition of Strunk, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2003). (PDF).
[5] Id.; see also Extradition Treaty, Nov. 13, 1994, U.S.-Phil., art. 7, para. 3, Sen. Treaty Doc. No. 104-16 (1996).
[6] Strunk at 1121.
[7] Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3184).
[8] Id. at 1121-22 (quoting Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition Applications, 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 277, 312 (2002)).
[9] Id. at 1122 (quoting Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978)).
[10] Id. (citing Hooker at 1369).
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 1140 (emphasis in original).
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. n. 32 (citing United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 501 (2d Cir. 1986); Hooker at 1366-68).